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views in the sciences, the humanities, history, and the like. This is some-
thing Mitchell does not address in this book, though he has elsewhere, 
particularly in The Justification of Religious Belief. But we should realize 
that the issue lies just below the surface. 
Otherwise, one might complain that the middle ground he favors is 
often characterized too unspecifically to give much useful guidance. 
Where we find partisans of opposite extremes it is always plausible to 
suggest that there must be some mediating position that accommodates 
the valid insights of both sides while avoiding the excesses of each. But 
actually doing the job is another matter. I have quoted Mitchell as pre-
senting, on one or another issue, some suggestions as to the form a mid-
dle position might take, but one may be pardoned for wanting some 
more substantial working out of such a position. But such a reaction 
would amount to wishing the author had written another book instead. 
What Mitchell has set out to do in this book is to address fundamental 
questions concerning the relation of faith and criticism, not develop a 
formulation of the faith that results from the actual deployment of such 
criticism. This is, if you like, meta-critical faith, not the first-level article. 
As with all meta-inquiries, many will be dissatisfied with the level of 
abstractness it exhibits. But long philosophical experience clearly indi-
cates that meta-investigations can guide and illuminate first level work 
in the trenches. So let us be thankful for the wise counsel contained in 
this book and profit from it when we undertake tasks of the sort upon 
which it is a reflection. 
Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed by James W. 
Felt. S.J. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv and 110. 
$28.95 (cloth); $9.95 (paper). 
EDWARD POLS, Bowdoin College 
Professor Felt's work is a remarkably clear and sometimes brilliant exer-
cise in what William James called popular philosophy. James himself 
often wrote or lectured in that mode, and probably nowhere more bril-
liantly than in his "The Dilemma of Determinism," which Felt cites and 
quotes. Felt's book, in its clarity, wit, and the vividness of its concrete 
examples, reminds me of that side of James. But to speak of Making Sense 
of Your Freedom as an exercise in popular philosophy means only that it 
is not addressed solely to an audience of professional philosophers. The 
book is clearly the product of a subtle mind, one that has managed to 
say something striking about many aspects of this difficult and impor-
tant problem. The book has an admirable unity and pace, and it can be 
read with profit by professionals working in the fields of philosophy 
and religion. 
The freedom that interests Felt, he tells us in chapter 1, manifests itself 
in the very act of choosing: it is, he says, the "characteristic or quality of a 
human act, specifically of the interior act of deciding to respond in some 
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particular way to the given situation" (p. 2). He calls this internal freedom 
and contrasts it with Locke's well-known freedom to do what one has 
decided (or what one wants) to do. Felt calls Locke's view external free-
dom. Internal freedom, he claims, is evident; "What is evident cannot 
strictly speaking be demonstrated," he remarks tellingly, "not because it 
is not the case, but on the contrary because it is evident" (p. 4). Acts that 
are free, in this internal sense, are those for which we are morally respon-
sible-responsible because the act originates within the self. 
Determinism is the doctrine which purports to show that freedom, in 
this internal sense, is impossible, so determinism becomes Felt's primary 
critical target. He defines it in chapter 2: "Determinism is the doctrine that for 
every event E there is a previous event or set of events D that guarantees the 
occurrence of E" (p. 7, emphasis in original). He distinguishes four vari-
eties-physical determinism, psychological determinism, logical deter-
minism (i.e., fatalism), and rational determinism-and sketches the argu-
ments for each of them, noting that there is some overlap in his categories. 
Before taking up the arguments against these forms of determinism, 
Felt turns aside, in chapter 3, to consider compatibilism-the doctrine 
that determinism is compatible with freedom and perhaps necessary for 
it. It is a rich chapter, and my treatment of it must be selective. Felt 
begins by dismissing summarily a form of compatibilism that does not 
insist that internal freedom (libertarianism), is compatible with deter-
minism but only that Locke's external freedom is compatible with a 
determinism that excludes internal freedom. Felt's dismissal of this kind 
of compatibilism is straightforward and clear: the real issue is between 
internal freedom and determinism, so this form of compatibilism misses 
the point. He then discusses compatibilism of the kind which argues that 
though we are determined, we could in a certain situation have done 
otherwise if we had in fact wanted to. The assumption of that version of 
compatibilism is that if we can propound an alternative in terms of 
"might have been," then we have a viable sense of freedom to correlate 
with our determinism. Felt argues that this is an illusory sense of free-
dom. Granted the truth of determinism, which is necessary to compati-
bilism, any alternative we imagine involving different motives, different 
circumstances, or both, is no genuine alternative; at best it provides only 
the external freedom Felt has already dismissed. 
Felt's account and criticism of the version of compatibilism which 
argues that there is no moral responsibility without determinism brings 
us in sight of his own position. Here he relies on a version of Aristotle's 
doctrine of responsibility, which hold that our acts do indeed follow 
from our characters but that our characters are in turn gradually devel-
oped by virtue of our responsible acts. This view of responsibility, Felt 
claims, is compatible with internal freedom. He also points out that com-
patibilists in general suppose that the only causal alternative to deter-
minism is pure chance: they are unable to see that when one invokes 
freedom, one invokes a causal principle rather than pure chance-a more 
ample causal principle, however, than compatibilists are willing to rec-
ognize (pp. 28-30). 
From Felt's arguments against his four kinds of determinism in chap-
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ters 4 and 5, I single out the one against logical determinism, or fatalism. 
The topic has been much written about, often enough in terms of 
Aristotle's famous discussion of "the sea battle tomorrow" in De 
Illterpretatione, which is also Felt's point of departure (pp. 41-42). He 
brings this difficult matter as close to his readers as it can be brought in 
so short a book: there are many concrete examples, and they are happily 
woven into the argument. The argument itself turns on (a) four asser-
tions about truth and the future (pp. 43, 47, 49, 53) and (b) three princi-
ples of being and becoming (pp. 56-57). 
The positive-as distinct from critical-part of Felt's book is a doc-
trine of causality designed to show that the agent's freedom consists in 
an exercise of causality rather than in the absence of causality (chaps. 6, 
7, 9). The three principles just mentioned are central to that doctrine, so I 
give here the simplified version of them Felt gives in chapter 9: "(A) The 
past is definite and settled .... (B) The present creates the definiteness of new set-
tled actuality out of a width of possibility for incorporating the past .... (C) 
Only the activity of real agents creates the definiteness of settled actuality" (pp. 
101-2). Felt's use of the principles depends upon the distinction he 
makes, in chapter 6, between subject-time, the time experienced by 
agents, and object-time, the time of the physicist. This chapter owes 
something to St. Augustine and something to Bergson. The free causality 
of agency, Felt says, has the same temporal structure as that of lived 
time, or subject-time: it "takes time but is not itself temporally divisible" 
(p. 84). What Felt calls subject-time I prefer to call act-temporality and to 
insist on a metaphorical applicability of such temporality to the causality 
operative in nature in general. I do not think Felt would disagree with 
that, but the expression 'subject-time' suggests a more radical cleft 
between the causality of agents and the causality of the rest of nature 
than I think he has in mind. But this is perhaps no more than a termino-
logical disagreement. As one who has argued, over many years, that if 
we are to understand human nature we must develop a more ample 
doctrine of causality, one in which human action itself is exemplary, I 
welcome the appearance of this compact and accessible book. An earlier 
version of chapter 8, "Becoming, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil," 
appeared in this journal (I [1984], 370-77). 
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, by John Martin Fischer. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. Pp ix and 273. $21.95. 
TED A. WARFIELD, University of Notre Dame 
John Fischer has been an active participant in discussions of freedom, 
determinism, foreknowledge, and moral responsibility for nearly two 
decades. Fischer's articles and anthologies on freedom and determin-
ism, freedom and foreknowledge, and moral responsibility are a tremen-
dous resource to philosophers working on these topics. In this wide-
ranging and clearly written book, Fischer adds to this already impres-
